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Carpenter: Framing Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence on a Textual Foundation
Seth Essendrop*
I.

Introduction

“This is a chance for you to say anything without repercussions,” Michael Scott assured his
employees, coaxing them into revealing times when they had violated “business ethics.” 1 After
several confessions of relatively minor infractions, including Scott’s own admission of “time
theft,” Meredith Palmer copped to a jaw-dropping violation: “I’ve been sleeping with [a vendor]
in exchange for discounts on our supplies and Outback Steakhouse gift certificates.” 2 This
revelation led to a conflict between the human resources representative who felt duty-bound to
report this behavior, and the manager who insisted that his promise of immunity shielded Meredith
from consequences for her misconduct.3
The scenario described above—a narration of an episode of the popular mockumentary, “The
Office”—is entirely fictional, but is nevertheless an apt metaphor for the very real issue of
determining how to apply Fourth Amendment protections in an increasingly digital world. While
many believe that the Amendment protects their online activities from the prying eyes of
government, courts have struggled to determine what data merits Fourth Amendment protections
in an ever changing, ever expanding universe of digital information.
Ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”4 As with much of the Bill of Rights, this amendment provided protection against abuses
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suffered by colonial Americans at the hands of the British.5 The specific evil this amendment
sought to remedy was the issuance of “writs of assistance” and “general warrants” which granted
law enforcement broad power to perform searches with minimal justification required. 6 The
Fourth Amendment enshrined the common law protection of enumerated items—persons, houses,
papers, and effects—which protection was grounded in property law, as set forth in Entick v.
Carrington in 1765.7 Though privacy was certainly an interest which was buttressed in the context
of the textually articulated items aforementioned, the amendment did not guarantee a general right
to privacy.8 And even to the extent that privacy is a protected interest in the Fourth Amendment,
its drafters could not possibly have foreseen the advent of the digital age, or the unique challenges
presented by the ubiquitous devices and voluminous data that characterize today’s world.
Even before the dawn of the digital revolution, the Supreme Court recognized that the propertybased conception of the Fourth Amendment, requiring a physical trespass to trigger the warrant
requirement, could not protect the privacy of citizens in the face of new technologies. Hence, in
1967, the Court ruled that absence of physical trespass alone could not obviate the need for a
warrant.9 Instead, an action would be a search—and thus require a warrant—if it violated an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, that is, if the individual demonstrated a subjective
expectation of privacy that society considered reasonable. 10
The advanced technology considered in Katz v. United States was a microphone enabling
eavesdropping into a phone conversation.11 Since then, the proliferation of devices, types of data,
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volume and granularity of data, and the capabilities for using that data in an intrusive manner have
added immense complexity to the questions of Fourth Amendment protections.
The number of devices in today’s world collecting and transmitting information is staggering.
Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in Carpenter that cell phones have become ubiquitous in the
modern world, almost equating them to appendages of their users.12 Cell phones have the ability
to collect and transmit information regarding location, movement, and also chronicle information
related to application usage, use patterns, internet search history, and a plethora of other data
points.13 So varied are the types of devices that can connect to the internet and transmit information
that they cannot be generalized as simply phones, computers, sensors, or even smart devices, but
are instead referred to generically as, the “Internet of Things” (IOT).14
The diversity of potential data sources is matched by the variety of data types these sources
analyze and disseminate. Wireless carriers collect information relating to internet usage to enable
billing.15 Files and pictures contain metadata (data about data) that provide information about the
file such as who created it, when it was created, where it was created, and, in the case of a
photograph, who is in the picture.16 Home devices may measure noise levels, temperature, motion
patterns, and more.17 Practically all smart phones and many other technological items are GPS-
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enabled and can track location information. Anymore, a large portion of a person’s daily activities
is chronicled and logged by the devices and applications with which they interact.18
Part of the issue, however, in applying Fourth Amendment protection to such data is that the
data is actually stored, and in many cases owned by third parties.19 Indeed, an individual may not
even be privy to the information collected about them, much of which is used for business purposes
by the entity collecting it.20 This data, collected, owned, and stored by third-parties—often
unbeknownst to the subject—cannot neatly fit within the items given explicit Fourth Amendment
protection.
Additionally, while the raw data may be revealing enough, it is now possible to mine and
analyze the information for the purpose of deriving powerful insights. Information about an
individual’s online activity is used to enhance the effectiveness of marketing to both that individual
and the public.21 Facial recognition technology has advanced to the point where persons in
photographs can be automatically tagged and identified.22 Banks and credit card companies are
able to detect fraudulent activity by comparing transactions against the known patterns in a
customer’s financial history.23 Political campaigns mine social media information to target voters
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and hone their message to appeal to those voters.24 These and other evolving technologies and
tools further encroach on the privacy of individuals, even when the data itself would not have been
revealing without them.
Some may indeed be alarmed by the revelation that the technologies and services they use are
in turn being used to monitor them. But, however uncomfortable it may seem, the collection of
user data by private actors does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, even though a warrant
may be required if the same surveillance were to be performed by state actors.25 What result, then,
when the government, without a warrant, co-opts a private party’s legitimate surveillance data
about their clientele?
Despite the contention of some that the Fourth Amendment should, and in fact, does provide
protection for Americans’ digital information, courts have been hesitant to provide blanket
protection to this data.26 In Katz, the Supreme Court announced a test, triggering the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement when a search violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.27 Such a privacy-based approach may seem to fortify data protection, but in reality, that
has not been the outcome of its application in practice.28
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389 U.S. 347, 352–54 (1967).
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Junker, supra note 2626, at 1125 (stating that “[w]hat is remarkable . . . is how little was changed by Katz's
abandonment of the ‘trespass’ standard of Olmstead . . . .”).

5

This is due, in large part, to the development of the “third-party doctrine,” which states that
information willingly provided to a third-party is not subject to a warrant requirement. 29 A cursory
glance at the privacy policies and terms of service of popular web sites, applications, and services
will reveal that each is collecting data on their users, and storing this information on their
technology infrastructure for use in a myriad of business applications.30 Thus, the third-party
doctrine placed a large amount of digital information outside Fourth Amendment protection,
enabling law enforcement to procure through subpoenas the data to which the doctrine applies.
In Carpenter v. United States, however, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement is
required to obtain a warrant before obtaining multiple days of cell-site location information
(“CSLI”) from a suspect’s cellular service provider. 31 The holding of the case was limited to the
factual circumstances at issue; the Court did not announce a rule, and did not clarify with precision
where the government crossed the threshold triggering Fourth Amendment protections, only that
law enforcement acted unconstitutionally. 32 But, the mere fact that the third-party doctrine did not
control in this case is significant, and will lead lower courts to divine factors from the Carpenter
decision which would mandate a warrant for searches which would otherwise be considered
reasonable.33
In this Comment, I will suggest a rationale for the Carpenter decision which would both bind
it explicitly to the text of the Fourth Amendment and simplify the application of the Carpenter
ruling to other cases. Additionally, while acknowledging that some digital content falls within the
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purview of the Fourth Amendment, I will caution against the expansion of its protections with no
textual justification.
Accordingly, Part II will provide a history of the Fourth Amendment, and the pre-Katz property
principles governing the determination of whether an activity constitutes a search. Part III will
analyze Katz and its progeny and explore the outcomes of a privacy-based approach to the Fourth
Amendment. Part IV will outline how a property-based approach has been applied in cases
involving technological advancements post-Katz. Part V will discuss Carpenter, its holding, the
rationale, and questions that will need to be answered in its wake. Part VI will argue for the
abandonment of the Katz test when evaluating potential Fourth Amendment concerns with new
technology. Part VII will introduce a potential property-oriented rationale for the holding in
Carpenter, and the application of such a principle in future cases. Part VIII will argue for the role
of the legislature in protecting the privacy of citizens in the absence of a clear Fourth Amendment
proscription of a search and seizure.
II.

Origins and Early Application of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment was not a safeguard against theoretical abuse of government power,
but a response to actual wrongdoing on the part of the British government. In Brower v. County
of Inyo, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “writs of assistance [were] the principal grievance
against which the Fourth Amendment was directed . . . .”34
These writs, which were a sub-species of general warrants, were instruments used in the
American colonies to enable law enforcement to perform wide-ranging searches of “ships,
warehouses, and homes, and all persons, papers, and effects contained therein . . . .”35 Most often,

34
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489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).
Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1244 (2016).
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they were used to deter smuggling, the evasion of customs, and other trade and tax-related
offenses.36 Not only were these writs broad in terms of authority granted and items which could
be searched, they also possessed an onerous temporal property. Once granted, these authorizations
did not expire until the death of the sovereign under whose authority they were issued. 37 Thus, if
a writ was issued against a citizen, the officers executing that writ would have carte blanche to
search the subject’s person, home, and place of business until the passing of the monarch.
The occasion of King George II’s death and the impending expiration of writs of assistance
issued during his reign provided the American colonists an opportunity to challenge the
government’s attempt to renew them. 38 In the ensuing action, “Paxton’s Case”, James Otis Jr.
issued a forceful denunciation of the tyranny and excesses of general warrants and writs of
assistance, asserting that their use would annihilate the freedom of “one’s house.”39 Though Otis
ultimately lost that case, the ensuing outrage proved an accelerant for the growing discontent with
British rule, and John Adams, who was present at the proceedings, remarked that “[t]hen and there
the child Independence was born.”40 Indeed, after the War of Independence, when the states were
considering ratification of the proposed Constitution, some decried the document’s silence as to
general warrants, an omission they termed one of the “curses” of the new Constitution.41
The historical record certainly demonstrates colonial Americans’ antipathy towards general
warrants, but this was not unique to America, nor was the rationale an outgrowth of a distinctly
American approach to law. The colonies were governed by English law, and the Americans
inherited conceptions of freedom and rights from Great Britain. Even in “Paxton’s Case” the

36
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colonials invoked “English liberties,” and their case rested on the well-known maxim in English
law that “a man’s house is his castle.”42
English common law did indeed provide rigid protection against invasion into a man’s home.
In fact, the seminal case on the topic, Entick v. Carington, was decided in 1765, and involved
exactly the type of general warrant against which Otis argued in Paxton’s Case.43 Entick involved
a general warrant issued for the search of libelous writings in the homes of individuals associated
and allied with John Wilkes, a politician in England.44 Though libel did not occur until publication,
and the possession of libelous materials itself was not a crime, officers were directed to “make a
diligent search” of Mr. Entick’s home, and the homes of his confederates, to find these types of
materials.45
Mr. Entick brought a trespass action against the officials who had searched his home and the
Secretary of State that issued the warrants. 46 The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that
the warrants in question were illegal, and thus, any search thereby authorized was a trespass.47
In Entick, the court rested its determination on the sanctity of an individual’s property, and the
strong protection afforded to such property by law against even government intrusion. “The great
end for which men entered society was to secure their property,” the court declared, adding that
“every invasion of private property . . . is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground
without my license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing . . . [the] defendant
is called to answer for bruising the grass and even treading on the soil.” 48

42
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Notably, however, in protecting the papers of the plaintiff, the court held that the “eye cannot
by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass . . . .”49 Simply viewing an individual’s papers did
not itself require a warrant, however, this invasion of privacy would serve to aggravate a trespass
and increase damages where the papers were obtained without a valid warrant authorized by a
magistrate.50
So famous and studied was this case that in Boyd the Court noted that “every American
statesmen, during our revolutionary and formative period . . . was undoubtedly familiar with
[Entick]” and its propositions provided the explanation for what constituted a search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. 51 Though Entick is an English case from 1765, it has been cited in
multiple Supreme Court decisions regarding the protections of the Fourth Amendment.52 As
recently as 2012, the Court has reaffirmed that Entick remains “‘the true and ultimate expression
of constitutional law’ with regard to search and seizure.”53
Accordingly, early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence did not require a warrant for law
enforcement to perform searches that would not otherwise constitute a trespass. Thus, for example,
in Olmstead v. United States, warrantless wire-tapping was deemed constitutional because in
tapping phone lines, the government did not physically intrude onto an individual’s person, house,
papers, or effects.54 Though some of the phones on which the government had set up monitoring
were within individual homes, the Court did not look to the privacy of the individuals under
surveillance, because no trespass had occurred to facilitate it. 55

49

Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 628.
51
Id. at 626–27.
52
See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001); United States v. U.S. D., 407 U.S. 297, 327; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627.
53
Jones, 565 U.S. at 405.
54
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
55
Id.
50

10

Justice Brandeis objected to this formalistic and text-based approach in his dissent. 56 The
Constitution, he asserted, was designed to be applied flexibly to situations which the drafters could
not have imagined.57 He looked beyond the “mischief which gave [the Fourth Amendment] birth”
to the principle underlying the amendment’s proscriptions.58 In his view, the Fourth Amendment
protected individuals from “all invasions on the part of the Government . . . of the sanctities of a
man’s home, and the privacies of life.”59
Though Brandeis was a dissenter in Olmstead, his privacy-centered approach ultimately won
vindication almost forty year later when the Supreme Court decided Katz.60
III.

Katz and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . have been so eroded . . . that the
‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”61 With these words,
the Supreme Court in Katz untethered the definition of a “search” from the text of the Fourth
Amendment, and replaced the formalism that had hitherto characterized their approach with a new,
privacy-centered test.62
The issue in that case was whether law enforcement’s use of a listening device in a telephone
booth for the purpose of eavesdropping on Mr. Katz violated his Fourth Amendment rights.63 The
government was attempting to find evidence that he was violating federal law by transmitting
wagering information across state lines through the use of a telephone. 64 Though the government

56

Id. at 472–74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 474.
60
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)
61
Id.
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argued that a telephone booth was not a protected area, as set forth in the text of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court declined to base its decision on the merits of that particular argument. 65
Instead, the Court focused on Mr. Katz’s expectation of privacy, declaring that the “Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”66 In overruling Olmstead and the trespass requirement,
the Court lambasted the formalism of the prior approach, and held that Fourth Amendment
protection “cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.”67
Justice Harlan’s concurrence best articulates the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test,
which replaced the trespass requirement as the judicial inquiry to determine if a search had
occurred.68 Under this new rule, a warrant would be required for investigative activities that
violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 69 This determination hinges on two
enquiries: (1) whether a person has shown an actual expectation of privacy in their activity and (2)
whether society would recognize that expectation as reasonable. 70
A. The Subjective Expectation of Privacy
In order to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy a person must have an intent to
keep something private. 71 In some cases, the Court has identified specific behavior of an individual
directed towards maintaining privacy. For example, though the majority opinion in Katz did not

Id. at 351 (stating that the question of whether the phone booth is a constitutionally protected area is “misleading”
and “deflects attention from the [real] problem presented in [the] case.”).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 353.
68
Cloud, supra note 62, at 249 (stating that the formula used in the opinion is an “amorphous standard” and was
therefore replaced with the test used in Justice Harlan’s concurrence).
69
Id.
70
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
65
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address this prong, Justice Harlan identifies Mr. Katz’s payment of a toll to use the phone, and his
having closed the door behind him as manifestations of his intent to preserve his privacy. 72
Often however, this intent must be inferred from the circumstances. When a person does
something in plain view, he cannot claim an intent to keep private what anyone could easily
observe.73 A warrant is not required to monitor a car on the highway, for example, and the Court
has held that when travelling in public roads the car and its contents are “in plain view” and thus,
the operator has not shown an intent to preserve privacy. 74
Revealing information to another undermines a subjective expectation of privacy, even when
the audience to which the revelation is made is limited, and even where the information disclosed
is confidential.75 According to the Court, when a person knows or should know what he conveys
to a third party will be somehow used by that party, he has no subjective intent to maintain the
privacy of that information. 76 Thus, when a person dials a phone number, he cannot expect the
number they dialed to be private, as that data point is used by the phone service providers to route
the call, and for other business purposes.77
Additionally, though the Court acknowledges that subjective expectations of privacy are
difficult to ascertain, historical determinations of what constituted a search and seizure when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted should inform the analysis.78 Therefore, for example, even when
an individual does not specifically manifest an expectation of privacy, the very fact of being in

72

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
74
Id. at 285.
75
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that Mr. Miller did not have a reasonable expectation of
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76
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (discussing the fact that telephone companies use the information around what phone
numbers a subscriber dials for business purposes, among which are billing. Subscribers know or should know that
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77
Id.
78
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018).
73
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one’s home merits a strong presumption that such an expectation applies, because the home has
always been afforded strong protections.79
B. Whether Society Is Prepared to Accept an Expectation of Privacy as Reasonable.
The simple fact that a person desires to keep something private does not, by itself, impose a
warrant requirement upon law enforcement before a search may be conducted; that expectation
must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 80 The Court in Katz illustrated
this by distinguishing the aspects of Mr. Katz’s conduct that merited Fourth Amendment
protection, and which did not.81 In response to the government’s contention that Katz was in plain
view, and thus was not eligible for protection, the Court stated that phone booths are not meant to
shield their occupants from view (notwithstanding the fact that the Man of Steel often resorted to
such a booth to protect his identity while changing clothes). 82 They are, however, designed to
maintain the privacy of the user’s conversation. 83 Thus, applying Justice Harlan’s reasoning,
society is prepared to accept as reasonable a phone booth user’s expectation of privacy. Insofar as
reasonability is dependent on the views of society, this prong of the test is necessarily a normative
determination.84 Conceivably, then, as cultural mores and feelings on the topic change, so too do
the boundaries of what would be protected.
Katz’s departure from the trespass requirement may seem, at first glance, to expand privacy
rights.

In reality, however, courts have historically applied a conservative approach in its

application, and have not, for the most part, wielded Katz to craft broader privacy protections.85
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Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (holding that, despite clear intent on the part of Mr. Ciraolo to
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81
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
82
Id.
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84
See Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 657 (2013).
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MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–11 (2004).
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Generally, the Supreme Court has declined to find that society is prepared to recognize a privacy

expectation as reasonable where an individual has taken the risk of exposing information either to
a limited audience or the public at large. 86
Thus, for example, in California v. Ciraolo the Court held that aerial surveillance does not run
afoul of societal expectations of privacy. 87 It does not matter that an individual is in a remote
location, or even on their own property or within the “curtilage” of their own home. 88 They have
assumed the risk of exposing their location, and whatever outdoor activities they are doing;
consequently, observing those activities is not a search.89 Privacy rights, then, may just as easily
be contracted under Katz as expanded, depending on the given court’s view of society’s
expectations.
This holding on aerial surveillance also highlights another chink in Katz’s privacy-protecting
armor. Namely that, when applying a Katz analysis of the reasonable expectation of privacy, the
Court has repeatedly ruled that individuals are not necessarily shielded from increased surveillance
capabilities available to today’s law enforcement.90 Modern technology allows law enforcement
capabilities that are magnitudes greater than their colonial counterparts would have had.
Nevertheless, increased efficiency in obtaining information and surveillance does not trigger
Fourth Amendment protection. 91 While acknowledging that extended periods of surveillance may
raise constitutional issues, the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation in a situation where
police used a beeper to track a vehicle’s movements.92 That is not to suggest, however, that all
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forms of surveillance may be employed without the necessity of first obtaining a warrant. The
demarcation between permissible and constitutionally problematic monitoring hinges on the type
of information the surveillance reveals. 93 If the information obtained through surveillance “could
not otherwise have been procured without physical ‘intrusion into the constitutionally protected
area’” the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant. 94
The third-party doctrine is another way in which society’s determination of reasonableness
abridges rather than enhances privacy. This doctrine states that, absent legislation to the contrary,
“when a person communicates information to a third party even on the understanding that the
communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party conveys that information . . . to
law enforcement . . . .”95 The rule first arose in the context of physical documents used in financial
transactions.96

In United States v. Miller, the Court ruled that a subpoena was sufficient

authorization for obtaining bank records, regardless of Mr. Miller’s expectation that his
correspondence with his bank should remain private. 97 The holding of Smith v. Maryland extended
this reasoning to a more technologically advanced fact-set, holding that the doctrine applied to the
phone numbers a person dials. 98 An individual, by necessity, shares a phone number with a cellular
provider when making a call, and that information is used to route the call to the correct party. 99
That information, being shared, loses Fourth Amendment protections. Notably, however, the
contents of the call itself, the conversation, may not be subpoenaed from a provider, because the
call itself was not shared with them. 100 Because the majority of data generated by and about
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individuals today is stored by a third party, and because that data is not even generated by the user
and thus is not content, the third party doctrine places a vast swath of data outside Fourth
Amendment protection.
In fact, the application of Katz has been so tepid, some have argued that outcomes of cases
analyzed under the Katz framework has not been appreciably different than would have been so
under the common law.101 Professor Orin Kerr even goes so far as to describe Katz as a “more of
a revolution on paper than in practice.”102 Indeed, he contends that the Court could have reached
the same result in the case had it applied Fourth Amendment trespass doctrine, and that the Court’s
explicit repudiation of this approach was therefore unnecessary.103 This argument relies on the
fact that a phone booth could arguably be considered a “house” for purposes of a Fourth
Amendment search determination, providing a tie-in to the literal text of the amendment.104
While the reasonable expectation test looks past the text of the Fourth Amendment to the
underlying principles, not text, courts have generally applied it conservatively. Due to the high
degree of subjectivity inherent in assessments of both individual expectations of privacy and
society’s tolerance for those expectations, judges have broad discretion when defining these in the
context of Fourth Amendment search determinations. Generally, even when an individual may
harbor expansive expectations of privacy, the protections for this privacy are reined in by the
second prong of the test.105 Despite the concern expressed by Justice White in his dissent from the
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Katz decision, its application has not produced a radical departure from the text of the Fourth
Amendment.106
IV.

Trespass and Technological Advancement

Trespass theory, though wounded in Katz, did not die. Despite suffering a major setback with
Olmstead’s reversal, some aspects survived, and some were folded into the reasonable expectation
of privacy test. While Katz overturned Olmstead, holding that a trespass is not a prerequisite to a
Fourth Amendment search, a physical trespass on a constitutionally protected area remains a
search requiring a warrant.107 The reasonable expectation of privacy test then did not replace
trespass theory, but merely supplemented it. Therefore, where a trespass does occur on property
enumerated in the text of the Fourth Amendment, the Court need not reach the question of whether
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and can instead proceed directly with common law
trespass doctrine.108
Accordingly, there is a line of cases in which the occurrence of a Fourth Amendment search
or seizure turns on the trespass doctrine without the need to resort to the Katz reasonableness
enquiry. Significantly, the Court has declined to abridge property rights, specifically in the home
when the Katz test might justify greater intrusion on the part of the government. 109 If an action

“an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area
immediately surrounding the home.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (finding that there is no
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would have been an unreasonable search or seizure under the old trespass doctrine, it would still
require a warrant; Katz, then, supplements trespass doctrine rather than supplanting it entirely.110
In United States v. Knotts, the Court ruled that a beeper in a barrel which transmitted a
defendant’s location to government authorities did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 111 While
this case ultimately turned on a Katz expectation of privacy analysis, the Court notes that the
defendant did not challenge the warrantless installation of the tracking device within the barrel that
defendant bought, then transported to his cabin. 112 The defendant did not challenge on the basis
of trespass on his car, due to the fact that he had placed the barrel within his car. 113 This distinction
became relevant in United States v. Jones, which did, in fact, turn on the occurrence of a trespass
on the car.114
In Jones, officers attached a tracking device to the undercarriage of the defendant’s car. 115 The
court held that a car constitutes an “effect” for Fourth Amendment purposes, and so, physically
installing a tracking device thereon is a search.116 The Court stated in simple terms that the
“[g]overnment physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”117
Because this trespass would have been considered a search at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s
adoption, it was considered a search, and there was no need to weigh the privacy considerations
implicated.118
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As technology has advanced, the Court has continued to protect the guarantee of privacy within
one’s house, which remains the “prototypical . . . area of protected privacy.”119 New innovations
enable sophisticated surveillance without the need for a physical trespass, and it is possible that
these developments could condition society to accept a reduction in privacy expectations in
response to these capabilities. 120 When faced with this challenge, the court looks to the degree of
privacy guaranteed at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption. 121 Put simply, if technology
enables the acquisition of information that would not otherwise have been obtainable without a
physical trespass on a constitutionally protected space, it is a search, and its use requires a
warrant.122
Even under the subjective test of Katz, the Court remains zealously protective of the home.
Before Katz, the mere act of cracking a door open and peeking inside was considered a search and
invading a structure by so much as a portion of an inch was a trespass and required a warrant.123
As previously stated, the mere existence of a tracking device on a vehicle does not constitute
a search if law enforcement did not physically place the instrument on the vehicle. 124 But, where
such a device transmits information from within or at a defendant’s “house,” Fourth Amendment
protections are activated. 125 It is true that any insights from a GPS transmitter on a car would be
evident to police who physically monitored the car: an officer could certainly follow the car until
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it parked at a house and wait until the car left again to continue pursuit. 126 Thus, it is not necessarily
the nature of the information, but the mere fact that the information was collected within a
constitutionally protected space that impedes its use.
While, in Knotts, the Court found that no search occurred where a tracking device was within
a vehicle which was parked near, but not inside a home, they did provide some insight into what
might constitute relevant factors in reaching a different result. 127 Specifically, the Court noted that
future cases may raise issues of otherwise lawful surveillance techniques becoming unlawful when
used to track individuals moving between private and public spheres. 128 Such monitoring may
“push fortuitously and unreasonably into the private sphere protected by the Fourth
Amendment.”129 But, the Court determined that as the barrel containing the beeper remained
outside the house, nothing was revealed that would not have been visible to the naked eye should
the police have relied on manual surveillance. 130
An individual’s residence is certainly afforded strong protections against government
intrusion; however, it is important to note that the “house” referenced in the Fourth Amendment
is not limited in its interpretation solely to a person’s primary residence.131 Central to the enquiry
of whether a space is deemed a “house”—or, in today’s legal parlance, whether an individual has
the same reasonable expectation of privacy as he would in his home—is whether an individual
possesses the right to exclude others from the space. 132 Renters, hotel room occupants, and even
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guests where there is evidence their host devolved on them the right to exclude other from the
space, would then qualify for Fourth Amendment protections in the respective spaces they occupy,
albeit temporarily.133 Professor Kerr even goes so far in his article as to suggest that by paying the
toll in the phone booth and shutting the door, Mr. Katz thereby transformed it into a “house” for
Fourth Amendment purposes, and this could provide a manner to reconcile the holding in Katz
with the text of the Fourth Amendment. 134 This larger point may prove useful in rationalizing the
Court’s evident discomfort with long periods of retroactive surveillance, as such surveillance
necessarily includes a “house” or multiple “houses” within its sweep.
Technology may not constitutionally allow invasion of a home’s privacy which would
otherwise require physical intrusion, but the mere fact that an activity was performed from within
a house does not thereby provide absolute Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless
surveillance.135 Thus, in Smith, the defendant could not assert Fourth Amendment protection over
the government’s acquisition of pen register information, even though he physically dialed the
phone numbers from within his house. 136 Phone conversations certainly were not possible at the
time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption. To achieve such a communication, an individual would
at least be compelled to open his window and conduct a conversation with a party outside his
home.

This conversation obviously would not be private, and one who observed such a

conversation could not be said to have conducted a search. 137
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The Fourth Amendment includes the house within its list of constitutionally protected areas. 138
In spite of Katz’s proclamation that this amendment protects “people not places,” the home remains
a constitutionally protected place, and government trespass thereon, by itself, is a violation of
Fourth Amendment protections. This trespass need not be physical; modes of surveillance may be
deemed a search if they achieve an affect that would have required a trespass had it been attempted
without the enabling technology.139 Finally, this protection is not immune from the caveat of the
third-party doctrine: the government may, without a warrant, obtain information from a third party,
regardless of whether that data originated from within the monitored individual’s home.140
V.

The Carpenter Decision

Carpenter provided an opportunity to consider the “dragnet-type law enforcement practices”
and “twenty-four hour surveillance of . . . citizen[s]” to which the Court in Knotts acknowledged
“different constitutional principles may be applicable.” 141 Where Knotts involved a beeper,
allowing law enforcement to track location, Carpenter deals with the subpoena of a form of
historical location information, cell-site location information (“CSLI”). 142 CSLI is a collection of
timestamped records collected by cell service providers when a phone connects to a cell site, which
in effect reveals the location of the cell phone at the time. 143 This information is used by cell phone
companies for multiple business purposes, including determination of fee structures (for example
when a user is “roaming”) but also to drive business decisions around where to increase

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (providing in relevant part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” is protected through the warrant requirement).
139
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
140
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–44.
141
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84.
142
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
143
Kyle Malone, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act: Why the Warrantless Gathering of
Historical Cell Site Location Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 708 (2012).
138

23

coverage.144 Because phones are constantly communicating with the network, whether the user is
actively performing an action or not, and because in many areas, the towers gathering this
information are closer and closer together, this information provides increasingly granular and
accurate information about a cell phone user’s movement that sometimes proves useful to law
enforcement in investigations.145
The specific evidence at issue in Carpenter was 127 days’ worth of CSLI data, composed of
12,898 discrete location records. 146 The Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to this
evidence, finding that a search had occurred.147 In reaching this conclusion, it cited the accuracy,
encyclopedic nature, and effortless collection of this type of data, and held that it is reasonable for
an individual to expect privacy in his physical movements from records so collected. 148 Notably,
however, this is not a categorical proscription on the use of CSLI. The Court stated explicitly that
the decision is not binding for factual circumstances not before the Court. 149 In spite of the focus
on the type of data at issue, CSLI, the Court explicitly excepted “real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’
(a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a
particular interval)” from the holding.150 Importantly, this case does not hold that people may have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location or their movements, but in the “whole of their
physical movements.”151 The difference between the two is one of degree, and nothing in the
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opinion suggests that the Court now takes an unfavorable view towards location monitoring for
shorter temporal periods.152
The departure from the third-party doctrine prompts two important inquiries: (1) why the
doctrine does not apply to acquisition of long periods of CSLI information from a third-party
provider and (2) what questions this raises for future cases involving similar types of records.
A. Why the Third-Party Doctrine Did Not Apply in Carpenter
There are two principle reasons the Court cites in support of its decision to distinguish CSLI
from other data types previously considered, and hence, not to apply the third-party doctrine in
Carpenter. First, because CSLI differs from the surveillance methods and data in prior cases as it
constitutes a far more exhaustive record of a person’s life, potentially exposing a wide panoply of
otherwise private information.153 Second, because CSLI—collected by “dint of operation” of the
phone—is not affirmatively “shared” with the third-party, and therefore, individuals do not lose
their expectation of privacy in this information. 154
i.

Difference Between CSLI and Traditional Records Subject to the Third-Party Doctrine
There are many ways in which the evidence at issue in Carpenter was broad and revealing.

In a previous case, the Court, in dicta, stated that long-term surveillance may present different
Fourth Amendment questions than 24-hour monitoring, or tracking a vehicle for discrete trips. 155
Here, the police obtained 127 days of location information, revealing all the movements of the
target in such detail that would not have been practical, and perhaps not even possible by physical
following at the time the Fourth Amendment was written. 156
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The sheer volume of records proves even more troubling because it allows a state actor to
meticulously catalogue an individuals’ life, and derive insights into their behavior.157 Data of the
type to which the third-party doctrine traditionally applied was relatively discrete.158 From bank
records, police could, perhaps, deduce spending habits or glean other financial records; similarly,
phone call records reveal details about discrete calls.159 Location information, however, when
aggregated over a long period of time, reveals much more than simply where the person was, it
can divulge, among other things, a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”160 As cellular providers increase their coverage and add cell towers, this information
becomes even more precise and the location may be ascertained to a more granular unit of
measurement.161
Perhaps as troubling is the fact that the information about any given suspect’s location is
already assembled and requires practically no effort from law enforcement to acquire. Previously,
determining an individual’s whereabouts at a given point in the past would have required finding
a witness or some discrete evidence placing the suspect at a given time at a given place. No single

157

See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing
Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 561 (2017) (“Prolonged surveillance reveals types of
information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and
what he does ensemble.”). The aggregation of location information may also be overlaid with other data sets to
produce even more insights. See generally Yan Huang et al., Mining Co-Location Patterns with Rare Events from
Spatial Data Sets, 10 GEOINFORMATICA 239 (2006).
158
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (dealing with microfilm copies of checks and deposit
slips); see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (holding that conversations with an individual could
be recorded and conveyed to police with no warrant required); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979)
(upholding the use of a pen register, which simply recorded a list of the phone numbers an individual dialed).
159
Prior cases dealt with limited data sets about specific activities. See supra note 159. Modern data mining, data
analytics, and artificial intelligence capabilities, however, require massive data sets in order to derive insights. See,
e.g., Nick Ismail, The success of Artificial Intelligence Depends on Data, INFORMATION AGE (Apr. 23, 2018)
https://www.information-age.com/success-artificial-intelligence-data-123471607/ (stating that “AI works best when
large amounts of rich, big data are available”).
160
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
161
See David Oscar Markus & Nathan Freed Wessler, That ‘70s Show: Why the 11th Circuit was Wrong to Rely on
Cases from the 1970s to Decide a Cell-Phone Tracking Case, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1179, 1183–84 (2016).

26

witness could testify to everywhere an individual had ever been.162 Thus, while at any given time,
a person may be conveying his location to “anyone who wanted to look,” the same cannot be said
of all his movements, taken together.
The outstanding question, then, is how much information is too much? At what point, or
for what interval of time are constitutional protections trigged? Though Carpenter is limited to
CSLI, the answer to that question would apply in any context involving the tracking of a person’s
location, including, as the Court acknowledged, the use of beepers and GPS trackers on vehicles. 163
ii.

Absence of Voluntary Exposure of Information Shared

One justification for the third-party doctrine is that a person assumes a risk, in revealing
information to another, that the other will reveal it to a state actor. 164 Part of the reason the Court
in Carpenter declined to apply the third-party doctrine to the data at issue was due to the
involuntary nature of the conveyance. 165 The indispensable nature of the phone and the method in
which the phone transmits CSLI are the factors that led the Court to this outcome. 166
Ninety-five percent of adults in America own a cell phone, and seventy-five percent own a
“smart phone.”167 The cell phone is ubiquitous, not only in terms of ownership, but also of location
relative to its owner. Increasingly, these devices accompany the user everywhere they go, so much
so that the Court characterizes it as “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy . . . .’”168
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (observing that “Sprint Corporation and its competitors are not your typical witnesses.
Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and their memory is nearly
infallible.”).
163
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Additionally, as the phone is carried everywhere, it is transmitting CSLI information on a
regular basis, whether in use or not. 169 If it is both turned on and connected to the network, this
information continues to flow to the wireless provider.170 This is not a feature that the user may
enable, opt out of, or even see; it is collected for the wireless provider’s use by dint of the phone’s
operation.171
There are, however, methods by which a phone’s owner may avoid such continual monitoring,
should he so desire. He could turn off his phone, he could disconnect it from the network, or he
could always decline to possess it on his person, at least for the period he does not want to be
tracked. Though the Court acknowledges these possibilities, it finds the compulsive use of cell
phones in today’s modern world renders the act of always carrying a connected and powered-on
phone involuntary.172
B. Issues Likely to Arise from Carpenter
The Carpenter decision has impacts beyond the explicit limits to the third-party doctrine as
well. In limiting the third-party doctrine as it does in Carpenter, the Court creates a Fourth
Amendment right of an individual in the business records of another.173 Though an individual may
have no knowledge of their CSLI being generated, and no involvement in creating the records,
they nevertheless have a right to assert warrant protection for those records by virtue of the fact
that they are “about” them. 174
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Additionally, though the Court recognizes the unique nature of location data in protecting the
privacies of life,175 this decision creates much uncertainty about the Fourth Amendment
protections of other data generated through IOT and smart devices, for example, which reveal
certain insights about users through the dint of their operation. Now that the Court has found a
category of data to which the third-party doctrine does not apply, lower courts will be challenged
to classify the numerous other species of data generated by devices on a constant basis.176 Whereas
the third-party doctrine provided a relatively simple answer to the Katz enquiry for data, this
decision opens the door for challenges to the warrantless acquisition of numerous other forms of
digital information.
Though the surveillance in Carpenter was not performed by law enforcement, but by a private
actor, the Court nevertheless treated the acquisition of this data as a search, as if the police had
conducted the surveillance themselves.177 This distinguishes this case from many of the prior
Fourth Amendment cases addressing surveillance, and raises questions around when private
actions can be attributable to the government in a way that requires a warrant. For example,
hitherto, under the private search doctrine, law enforcement need not obtain a warrant for searches
conducted on items which a third-party has already searched, whether that party was entitled to
perform the search or not.178

This doctrine currently facilitates the cooperation of private

companies with government agencies in finding and identifying users of child pornography for the
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purpose of combatting child abduction and exploitation. 179 Technology companies are able to
compare the digital signature of files in user’s accounts (a hash) to the signature for known child
pornography media.180 This scan is run on a continual basis, and when the company finds an image
that matches the description, it alerts the government to the existence of the file, and the identity
of the owner of said file. 181 Because the company has already abridged the user’s privacy by
identifying the file, the government is not required to obtain a warrant to verify the contents of the
file.182

In effect, the scanning required to identify these files constitutes twenty-four hour

surveillance. For all intents and purposes, the government is facilitating the invasion of privacy
by a private party not bound by Fourth Amendment search requirements and is able to create a
loop-hole by which it can constantly surveil the defendant’s files for contraband. Given that the
Supreme Court found a subpoena of information maintained and exploited by a third-party
problematic in Carpenter, this may initiate the partial undermining of the private search doctrine
as well.183 Can a company voluntarily surrender to the government non-content data on its users
which would otherwise require the state to obtain a warrant?
VI.

The Shortcomings of Katz in the Context of Technological Advances

The third-party doctrine has held at bay many issues arising from the application of Katz to
new technological paradigms. But, in carving out an exception, Carpenter generates uncertainty
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around application of the test to other novel surveillance questions and may thus inject more
subjectivity in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
One problem in applying a test which relies on societal norms is that, by definition, there is no
societal norms around the treatment of new technology. Society has not yet established norms and
expectations around new technologies, and courts will thus be left to guess what society might be
prepared to accept in such cases. 184 This essentially places judges in the role of policy-makers,
and rather than determining what society’s expectations are, they will be enabled and even
expected to announce what society’s expectations should be instead. 185 Indeed, there are few
guidelines in determining what society is prepared to accept as reasonable. In Ciraolo, for
example, the Court upheld aerial surveillance because, it reasoned that individuals have no
expectation of privacy in what is visible to the naked eye, and further, are aware that aircraft are
flying overhead.186 Thus, the knowledge that information is visible to others, and the general
knowledge that surveillance is occurring could conceivably create a cycle of diminishing privacy
expectations. Already, society is aware of data breaches, hacks, corporate misuse and improper
sharing of information, in addition to potentially improper government surveillance. 187 Because
society has thus been conditioned to expect and grown accustomed to a reduced expectation of
privacy, should this mean that the Katz test allows technology advancements to rob Americans of
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privacy rights? In Kyllo, the Court acknowledges the possibility of such a cycle, and technology’s
erosion of privacy rights through the “reasonable expectation” prong of the Katz test.188
The Katz test’s potential to create results that are “subjective and unreasonable”— which the
Supreme Court acknowledges—might have been an acceptable trade-off if it achieved the goal of
protecting the privacy that underlies the Fourth Amendment.189 But it is not completely certain
whether the Katz approach provides greater or lesser protection than the text of the Fourth
Amendment itself, and the trespass approach. In the cases of aerial surveillance and the use of a
pen register to capture phone numbers dialed from within a home, for example, application of the
Katz test resulted in reduced privacy expectations, rather than more. 190 Further, the circularity of
the reasonable expectation of privacy, and the potential subjectivity of its application have led to
criticism that the doctrine is a “black hole” that “has never been able to do the work required of
it.”191
Additionally, Katz, though formulated to deal with advanced technological capabilities and the
challenges associated therewith, presents a more fundamental challenge, that of reconciling it with
the text of the Fourth Amendment. In his dissent from Katz, Justice White lamented the Court’s
attempt to “keep the Constitution up to date,” warning that the “effort would make [the Supreme
Court] a continuously functioning constitutional convention.” 192 As noted earlier, though the
language of the Katz test does not require a touchpoint to the text of the Fourth Amendment, courts
have been conservative in their application, such that the use of the Katz test has not resulted in
vastly different outcomes than would reliance on common law trespass doctrine. Given that
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Carpenter has created a crack in the third-party doctrine, however, it is conceivable that courts
could craft responses and tests for what constitute a search that would have no possible justification
in the text or historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment.
VII.

Reconciling Carpenter with the Text of the Fourth Amendment

Given the subjectivity of the Katz doctrine and the Court’s own admission in Kyllo of its
problematic application, courts should adopt an interpretation of the Carpenter decision that is
grounded in the text of the Fourth Amendment and common law trespass doctrine, and which
minimizes subjectivity when defining what constitutes a search in novel technological scenarios.
In so doing, courts should recognize that, while the Fourth Amendment protects a degree of
privacy, the framers could not possibly have conceived of today’s technology. Thus, it is not a
foregone conclusion that individuals have a reasonable Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy
in their data. Rather than crafting new protections, and thus fulfilling Justice White’s fear of the
court devolving into a constitutional convention of its own, courts should refrain from making
policy decisions where the Constitution is silent.
Accordingly, the Court should afford new protection only when a government action
potentially violates the privacy or security of one’s person, house, papers, or effects. When
determining the contours of what qualifies for these designations, courts will be forced to grapple
with tough questions, but this mitigates some of the concern of judicial abuse of power. In the
context of the IOT, smart devices, and even computers generally, some records may be easily
analogized to the physical items originally protected by the Fourth Amendment. For example, an
individual’s computer files could easily be related back to the “papers” mentioned in the Fourth
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Amendment.193 Indeed, the naming of files and folders in the computer context is an implicit
acknowledgement that they are the functional equivalent of physical papers, and the Court already
distinguishes between content and non-content data.194 As to devices, however, it is more difficult
to draw a neat analog to the founding days, or even trespass principles. Some have suggested the
concept of categorizing smart devices as “effects,” and protecting their associated data through a
theory of “digital curtilage.”195 Debating the wisdom of a given classification is beyond the scope
of this article, however, the very existence of a textual hook provides greater certainty and
mitigates concerns of judicial activism. To disregard the enumeration of protected properties in
the Fourth Amendment is to imply that they are gratuitous, and unnecessary to the Amendment.
Courts may desire to protect the privacy that was perhaps the object of the Fourth Amendment,
but they should avoid the temptation to disregard the letter of the law in their zeal to fulfill the
spirit.
It is possible that such an approach, though it may change the outcome in certain cases, may
not even diminish privacy protections. As previously noted, the current Katz test as applied is
already a mixed-bag in terms of its effect on privacy rights. While acknowledging that there will
be some normative violations of individual privacy that are beyond the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection, as defined in the text of the amendment, the Court should provide strong
and liberal protection where an analog can be shown to the items enumerated in the constitution.196
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In the case of Carpenter, evaluating the ruling in light of the protections outlined in the text of
the Fourth Amendment would provide clarity to some of the concerns raised by the ruling and
eliminate others.
It is important to acknowledge that, when dealing with time-series data, as in Carpenter, law
enforcement is actually performing surveillance, albeit retroactively.197

The records the

government may attempt to acquire from a company have already been collected by that company.
But, for Fourth Amendment search purposes, this data should be treated as if the government had
collected it, because acquiring examining these records is the functional equivalent to performing
the surveillance in real-time.198 The Court in Carpenter and in Knotts expressed reservations about
the implications of twenty-four-hour surveillance, and, in the case of Carpenter, the use of data
even when held by a third party. 199 While the reasoning in Carpenter was couched in the language
of privacy, the truth is, allowing the government to benefit from a private entity’s constant
surveillance of an individual enables law enforcement to trespass in constitutionally protected
areas with impunity. In Kyllo, the Court emphasized the need to “assure preservation of that degree
of privacy that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” 200 This concern resulted in a
prohibition on the warrantless acquisition of information about a house that previously could not
be obtained without physical intrusion. 201

By the same token, increased efficiency due to

197

The Court in Carpenter, while not explicitly endorsing this proposition, analogized retroactive data collection to
physical surveillance. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). Further, it notes that society would
not expect that police officers could or would physically perform the surveillance yielding the equivalent volume and
type on information which historical CSLI provides. Id. at 2217–18.
198
This is not to imply that an agency relationship exists, but merely a realization of the reality that when law
enforcement obtains this information, it is as if they were performing the surveillance themselves.
199
The fact that CSLI is held by a third party was ultimately irrelevant to the outcome of Carpenter, as the Court
found that the nature and quantity of this data placed it beyond the scope of the third-party doctrine. Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2216–17.
200
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
201
Id.

35

technology advances in the field of surveillance does not, in itself, pose a constitutional
conundrum.202 This is especially the case when law enforcement could have obtained the same
information through constitutionally permissible means in the absence of the technology.203 The
common thread is that technology, while enhancing law enforcement capabilities, cannot provide
access to what would have required a trespass. While there was no concept of the comprehensive
historical time-series data in the founding era, utilizing this information is the functional equivalent
of performing surveillance, and the limits that would apply to physical surveillance should apply
equally in this context, irrespective of the involvement of a third party.
If information is not simply fair game because it is held by a third party, courts need not address
whether an individual actively shared information or not. Indeed, it is difficult to determine
whether an individual has shared something with a third-party, as demonstrated in Carpenter. The
conclusion that location sharing is involuntary because avoiding it would require turning off the
phone, disconnecting it from the network, or not carrying it constantly is troubling because it
premises the outcome of the case on the implied lack of agency when it comes to phone
discipline.204 It is well-known that cell phones track a user’s location. Therefore, by carrying a
cell phone and not taking precautions against this tracking, individuals assume the risk of
broadcasting their location. But, if the relevant enquiry is not solely whether the information about
the user is shared with a third party, but instead, whether lawful police surveillance would have
been able to achieve the same result, the problem of voluntary versus involuntary sharing drops
out of the equation. There are too many devices, broadcasting too much information, for too many
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purposes, with too many metrics to make determinations for each whether active sharing has
occurred.205 Indeed, the way individuals interact with their technology is continuing to change at
a rapid pace and creating a coherent rule regarding a user’s expectation for each technology would
be an exercise providing little clarity, and one that would likely be repeated frequently as new
technologies emerge. Instead, the Court should distinguish between affirmative acts by the user,
and autonomous recording by the device. Where an individual consciously shares something with
a third party, less privacy should be afforded, consistent with Miller.206 At the same time, where
a device can be co-opted to perform surveillance retro-actively, the data associated with that device
should be subject to the same limitations that would be applicable if the government were
performing physical surveillance. This solution would both protect the privacy of the house
against technological erosion of Fourth Amendment protections and provide greater clarity as to
when the information could be used.
In Carpenter as in Knotts, the Court expresses discomfort regarding the possibility of 24-hour
surveillance.207 While holding that the facts in Carpenter required a warrant, however, the Court
did not announce a rule that could be applied consistently. 208 Instead, the Court noted the sensitive
information about the “privacies of life” location data would expose. 209 But, this concern is present
whether surveillance occurs for one or 20 days, the difference is simply a matter of degree. Knotts,
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while not ruling directly on the topic, framed the problem as one of moving between public and
private spheres, and thus while the method of surveillance may be warranted, the constitutionality
may turn on the time and location during which surveillance is taking place. 210
When requesting time-series data from a past time period one would necessarily be ignorant
as to its contents until examining it. Thus, it is possible, for example, that for records requested in
a given time period, the data would include information that is collected from within the surveilled
party’s home, giving rise to Fourth Amendment concerns.211 This fact, however, should not
preclude the gathering of any data whatsoever. Instead, Carpenter could be applied to preclude
government from subpoenaing time-series records (location or otherwise) that would almost
certainly contain information protected by the Fourth Amendment due to its likelihood to reveal
something about the home. This would entail limiting subpoenaed documents to periods of time
that are not certain to include time where the defendant would be at his house, for example. When
requesting documents, the government would be limited to time ranges beneath twenty-four hours,
as an individual is almost certain to be at his house at some point within that interval. Even if not
at his own house, he would be somewhere that would still qualify as a “house” be it a hotel room
a guest room in another’s house, or another temporary residence.212 This would not necessarily
burden law enforcement unduly. In Carpenter, for example, the government was attempting to
link Carpenter to known crimes. 213 Thus, in reality, there were certain time ranges in which the
government was truly interested that would have provided the evidence of his proximity to the
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crimes.214 Much of the information obtained by the government was gratuitous, and there was not
necessarily a basis for suspecting the defendant of nefarious activity in that time. 215 A subpoena
requesting the time ranges corresponding to the known crimes would have served the
government’s purpose, respected privacy rights, and would have been consistent with the holding
in Carpenter.
Applying a likelihood of trespass approach to subpoenaed time-series data would not only limit
the government from obtaining broad swathes of time, for which a small percentage is actually
relevant to the crime under investigation, it would also provide further protection to individuals
with respect to, for example, the time of day for which records could be requested. If there is no
reason to believe an individual is out of his home at 1:00 am, then subpoenaing information for
that time would amount to a trespass, as it is more likely than not that an individual would be
home. The suspicion, however, that an individual committed nefarious acts at that time, supported
by any evidence would reduce the likelihood that particular individual would have been in their
home at that time, and would provide justification for the subpoena. This approach would provide
clarity in the application of Carpenter, provide a textual basis for judicial holdings, and enhance
Fourth Amendment protections for individuals while still affording law enforcement the ability to
perform needed investigative work without the burden of obtaining a warrant.
VIII.

Alternatives to New Judicial Standards

This Comment does not seek to take a position on the desirability or detriment of increased
protections for privacy given the ever-changing technological landscape. What it does argue,
however, is that threats to individual privacy and the need for protection does not justify the
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invocation of the Fourth Amendment in cases where doing so requires a departure from the text
itself. Ultimately, even given the contention of some that the Constitution and its provisions were
designed to have enough flexibility to handle novel situations, it must be admitted that the drafters
of the Fourth Amendment could not possibly have imagined the challenges attendant to technology
today.216 Resorting to their underlying intentions, then, is a futile exercise because there are many
scenarios faced today which bear no resemblance, and cannot be analogized to the specific
problems the Founders sought to address with the Fourth Amendment. 217 That is not to say that
all technology is beyond the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. But it does mean that we
should acknowledge the possibility that there are some things that may not be rationalized to the
text of the amendment, and threats to privacy notwithstanding, the Amendment should not be
adjusted to cover such gaps.
One of the ironies of a judicial standard which requires a court to ascertain what society at
large finds reasonable is that judges are uniquely ill-equipped to grapple with this question. The
Supreme Court has even conceded to the criticism of Katz’s application as being “circular, and
hence subjective and unpredictable.” 218 In cases that involve items mentioned in the text of the
Fourth Amendment, the application is straightforward: society presumptively accepts an
expectation of privacy in those things to which the Constitution explicitly grants protection. 219 In
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Carpenter, however, the Court looked to historic law enforcement capabilities and reasoned that,
because surveillance yielding the type of information at issue would have been costly and
practically impossible prior to the digital age, society recognizes an expectation of privacy against
it as reasonable today.220 It is true, however, that society’s tolerance changes over time, and thus,
it is unclear why the Court chose to reference pre-digital age society in that case to determine
reasonableness. Because this is a subjective test, the sword cuts both ways. Indeed, were that
logic applied to Ciraolo, the Court would perhaps have found the defendant’s expectation of
privacy against aerial surveillance reasonable. After all, before flight became common-place, this
would not have been possible.221 Though society’s expectations may change, these decisions have
precedential effect, and thus become evidence of what society would find reasonable.
As it happens, there is a mechanism through which society may express its views on what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy: the legislative process. Where the Constitution
does not mandate a warrant, Congress and the states may nonetheless add however much
protection they deem necessary to sufficiently protect the privacy of their respective citizens. In
fact, there are many examples of Congress doing just that. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act—while not going so far as to mandate a warrant when the government seek to
obtain medical information from a provider—does require that provider to notify the patient before
the records are disclosed, giving them the opportunity to object in court.222

The Stored

Communications Act provides several protections for data that is stored by a third party, even
requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before it may request certain information. 223
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Even where the Court has not found a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Congress has, at
times, stepped in to impose privacy requirements. In fact, the Right to Financial Privacy Act was
passed in response to Miller, prohibiting the government conduct which the Court held not to be
violative of the Fourth Amendment. 224

Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) now prohibits law

enforcement from installing a pen register without a Court order, another activity which the Court
found to be compatible with Fourth Amendment protections. 225
These examples show that Congress is both willing and able to act in order to protect privacy,
and that it is not necessary for the Supreme Court to go beyond the text of the Fourth Amendment
to achieve the same result. Indeed, Congress is better suited to handle such questions as it is more
representative than the courts, and is vested with considerable fact-finding capabilities, allowing
it to better tailor solutions. 226 When the Court acts to expand the Fourth Amendment, it short
circuits the process, robbing society of the benefit of a needed robust debate on the issue. Rather
than attempting to fix an issue, or guarantee privacy not explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution,
the Court, in strictly interpreting textual provisions should allow inconsistencies and inadequacies
in the law to manifest themselves, allowing the legislators to address these in a manner that accords
with the will of the people.
IX.

Conclusion

The Katz test, with its focus on privacy, may seem to provide flexibility for Fourth Amendment
protections in the context of a digital world, but in reality, it has not produced a great shift in
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outcomes.

Similarly, though the Carpenter decision departs from the third-party doctrine,

announcing a right of privacy in the whole of one’s physical movements, the case need not be
disruptive of the Fourth Amendment status quo. As technology continues to advance, however, it
becomes clearer that the Fourth Amendment may not continue to stretch and provide protection to
privacy generally without completely detaching it from the literal text.
Courts should see in Carpenter an opportunity to take a more text-based approach and return
to property concepts on which the Fourth Amendment was based. Indeed, there is no need for
courts to assume the role of guardians of privacy as that is both the province of Congress, and
something they have shown themselves capable of addressing.
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